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only after a verdict was returned that the
trial court "exercising its perceived
power to engage in judicial hindsight,
stated that it should never have permitted the case to continue and sua sponte
embarked on the sanctions phase of the
trial." Id. at 478, 568 A.2d at 863.
Although the court conceded that justified sanctions could be imposed for
conduct during the trial, such as dilatory
tactics or abusive conduct, no such allegations were ever made. Id. at 479,568
A.2d at 864. Accordingly, the court held
that because the evidence was sufficiently debatable to deny motions
throughout the trial, it was sufficient to
justify Gerst in bringing and continuing
her case. Id. Thus, the court of special
appeals concluded that the trial court's
decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at
479-80, 568 A.2d at 864.
In so ruling, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland once again clearly discouraged the excessive use of Rule 1-341
sanctions. Such use can only impose a
chilling effect on a plaintiff's right to
court access, while providing an uncertain environment for attorneys to act. As
the court opined, Rule 1-341 should only
be used in the most extreme of instances
when a claim is clearly meritless and
intended to remedy only intentional misconduct.
- Vasiliki Papaioannou

Pavelic & leFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group: SANCTIONS FOR VlOIATIONOFHID~RurnOF~

PROCEDURE 11 ONLY APPLY TO

TIlE INDIVIDUAL SIGNER
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989),
the United States Supreme Court held
that sanctions provided by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11") only
applied to the attorney who signed a
paper in violation of Rule 11, even if the
attorney explicitly signed on behalf of his
fIrm.
On behalf of Northern ]. Calloway,
attorney Ray 1. leFlore brought a willful
copyright infringment claim in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Marvel
Entertainment Group ("Marvel"). In an
amended complaint, Calloway alleged
that Marvel forged his signature. After
initiation of the claim, leFlore formed the
law partnership ofPavelic & leFlore with
Radovan Pavelic. Several papers relying
on the allegation of forgery were signed:
"Pavelic & leFlore
By /s/ Ray 1. leFlore
(A Member of the Firm)
Attorneys for Plaintiff. "

Id. at 457. The district court found that
these papers were in violation of Rule 11
and imposed a sanction in the amount of
$100,000 against Pavelic & leFlore.
Upon a motion by Radovan Pavelic, the
district court shifted half of the sanction
from the fIrm to LeFlore, because the fum
did not exist during the major part of the
litigation. However, the district court rejected Pavelic's contention that Rule 11
only empowered the court to impose the
sanction upon LeFlore and not upon the
fum. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affIrmed the sanction. The Second Circuit's decision directly conflicted
with a Fifth Circuit holding that authorized Rule 11 sanctions against only the
individual signers. Id. at 458 citing Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808
F.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1987)).
Pavelic appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the
Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit and
reversed the Second Circuit. In interpreting Rule 11, the Court relied on the plain
meaning of the rule. Pavelic & LeFlore,
110 S. Ct. at 458 (citing Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446U.S. 740, 750n.9(1980)).
Where a pleading, motion, or other
paper violates Rule 11, the rule requires
the trial court to "impose upon the person who signed it . . . an appropriate
sanction." Id. The Court noted that if
viewed in isolation, the phrase "person
who signed" is ambiguous. Id. However,
upon reading the phrase in the entire
context of Rule 11, the Court reasoned
that since Rule 11 begins "with a requirement of individual signature, and then
proceed [s] to discuss the import and consequences of signature, ... references to
the signature in the later portions must
reasonably be thought to connote the
individual signer mentioned at the outset." Id.
In rejecting Marvel's contention that
the legal principles of partnership and
agency should apply, the Court emphasized that Rule 11 established a duty that
an attorney could not delegate. Id. at 459.
The Court also held that although LeFlore
explicitly signed on behalf of his fIrm, the
sanction only applied to leFlore individually. The Court reasoned that a signature
on behalf of a fum could not comply with
the fIrst sentence of Rule 11, since it
requires papers to be signed "by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name." Id. The Court noted
that in the past, the preferred practice for
an attorney was to sign on his own behalf
with the name of his fIrm beneath. Id.
(citing Gavit, The New FederalRules and
State Procedure, 25 A.B.A.). 367, 371
(1939)).

Although a law fum may have more
funds than an individual signer, the Court
noted that the purpose of the sanction
was punishment rather than reimbursement. The Court also noted that the function "of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring
home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility." Id.
at 460. Moreover, the Supreme Court
determined that holding an individual
signer personally liable provides a greater
economic deterrent. Id.
In a lone dissent, Justice Marshall argued that Rule 11 sanctions can apply to
a law fum. At fIrst, the rule uses the term
"signer," but later in its discussion of
sanctions, the rule uses the phrase "the
person who signed." Id. at 461 (Marshall,
]., dissenting). The dissent noted that in
the context of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, one could reasonably assume
that the drafters meant the term "person"
to include partnerships and professional
corporations. Id. (Marshall, )., dissenting) (citing 5 u.s.c. § 551 (2); NY. Partnership Law § 2 (McKinney 1988)).
Recognizing that the sanction should be
tailored to each situation, Justice Marshall opined that Rule 11 allowed the trial
judge to decide whether sanctions
would more properly be applied to the
attorney or his law fum. Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that individual accountability may
be heightened if an attorney's negligence
also subjected his law fIrm to liability. Id.
at 461-62 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
In holding that Rule 11 sanctions apply
only to the attorney who signs a paper in
violation of the rule, the United States
Supreme Court precluded the application of Rule 11 sanctions to law firms. As
a result, parties may fmd it more difficult
to collect reimbursement for expenses
caused by Rule 11 violations, but personal liability may provide a greater incentive for attorneys to comply with Rule
11.
-Richard E. Guida

Simpler v. State: POllCE MAY NOT

FRISK A SUSPECf AS A MATI'ER OF
ROUI1NE CAIDlON, TIJERE MUST BE
A REASONABLE SUSPIOON TIIAT
THE SUSPECf IS ARMED AND DANGEROUS
In Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 568
A.2d 22 (1990) the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held the seizure of paraphernalia with marijuana residue was unconstitutional where the suspect was frisked
without reasonable suspicion that he was
armed and dangerous.
On the evening of May 8, 1987, Sergeant Wassmer (Wassmer), of the Cecil
County Sheriff's Department, and a
young explorer scout were on routine
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In Simpler, the court of appeals further
patrol. Wassmer observed black smoke
had obtained the beer for the juveniles,
in violation of art. 27, section 401. Id. at
coming from a wooded area behind the
stated that Terry has never been recogWinding Brook Housing Project and pronized to authorize a frisk on the occasion
315,568 A.2d at 24.
A violation under either of these proceeded to investigate. Wassmer and his
of every authorized stop. In minor traffic
companion came upon a group of three
visions authorizes the arresting officer to
violations, where the stops were for the
issue a citation. See Md. Ann. Code art.
males and a female standing around an
purpose of issuing citations, other ciropen fire drinking beer. The individuals
27, section 403A. Both violations are
cumstances must be present in order to
merely civil offenses, which at the time
appeared to be underage, therefore
constitutionally justify the frisk, such as
of Simpler's violation, were subject to a
Wassmer requested identification from
an observation of an object which might
maximum fme for first offenders of
each of them. In addition, Wassmer
be a weapon or a bulge in the suspect's
frisked the three males and with consent
$100.00. Id at 316, 568A.2d at 24.
clothing. Simpler, 318 Md. at 320, 568
searched the female's purse. The identiAlthough Wassmer had reasonable
A.2d at 26-27 (citing Michigan v. Long,
fication of one of the male suspects, Simsuspicion that Simpler violated either
463 u.s. 1032 (1983); Pennsylvania v.
section 400A or section 401, the violapler, disclosed he was twenty-one years
Mimms, 434 u.s. 106 (1977».
of age. Wassmer's frisk of Simpler retions authorized Wassmer to stop SimThe court of appeals recognized there
pler, obtain indentification, and issue a
vealed a marijuana pipe in his rear
is likely some risk to a police officer in
pocket. Wassmer believed the pipe concitation. The court of appeals found
every confrontation, however, the risk
tained marijuana residue. The pipe was
Simpler's violation analogous to a minor
must have risen to a higher level of danseized and Simpler was arrested. The
traffic violation, in that it authorized the
gerousness than was present in the case.
three others, all juveniles, received a ciarresting officer to issue a citation. MoreSimpler and the other juveniles were
tation for possession of alcoholic beverover, like a minor traffic violation, neistanding in Wassmer's full view and the
ages. See Md. Ann. Code art. 27, Section
ther violations were custodial arrests,
frisk was not conducted because Wass400A (1957, 1989 Cum. Supp.).
and therefore the frisk was not justifiable
mer feared safety but as a "matter of
Wassmer had contact with Simpler, on
as having been made incident to the arroutine caution." Simpler's offense, wara prior unrelated occassion, where Wassrest. Id. at 317,568 A.2d at 25.
ranting only a citation, did not in and of
mer was aware Simpler had a knife used
In Terryv. Ohio, 392 u.S. 1 (1968), the
itself justify the frisk.
for the cutting of carpet, in his possesSupreme Court held:
Awareness on the part of the police
where a police officer observes unsion.
officer that the suspect had previously
usual conduct which leads him reaSimpler's pretrial motion to suppress
been armed may, in certain instances,
sonably to conclude in light of his
the evidence seized by the frisk was dejustify the frisk. Simpler 318 Md. at 318experience that criminal activity
nied. Judge Rasin, Jr., presiding over the
19,568 A.2d at 25 (citing La Fave, Search
may be afoot and that the persons
suppression hearing stated: "[Wassmer]
and
Seizure: A Treatise of the Fourth
with whom he is dealing may be
made an investigation. He observed what
Amendment § 9.4(a) at 505-06 (1987».
armed and presently dangerous,
appeared to be violation of the law ....
But in Simpler, the court of appeals
where in the course of investigating
And it's normal for the officer to pat
this behavior he identifies himself as
stated: "Wassmer's description of the eardown those who were there .... " Sima policeman and makes reasonable
lier occasion . . . is devoid of any aspect
pler, 318 Md. at 315, 568 A.2d at 23-24.
inquiries, and where nothing in the
of dangerousness." The court of appeals
initial stages of the encounter serves
At trial, Wassmer testified that the indiexplained that the carpet knife was a
to dispel his reasonable fear for his
viduals were frisked "as a matter of roucarried knife, similar to a pocket
lawfully
own or others' safety, he is entitled
tine caution" and Simpler was convicted
knife.
Wassmer's
knowledge that Simfor the protection of himself and
of possession of marijuana. The court of
pler had carried a carpet knife on a prior
others in the area to conduct a carespecial appeals affirmed Simpler's conoccasion was not reasonable suspicion
fully limited search of the outer
viction. The court agreed with the State's
clothing of such persons in an atthat Simpler was armed and dangerous at
position that Wassmer's knowledge of
tempt to discover weapons which
the time of the frisk. The State failed to
Simpler's having previously carried a
might be used to assault him.
sustain its burden of showing that
carpenter's knife supplied the additional
Simpler, 318 Md. at 317-18,568 A.2d at
Wassmer's knowledge of Simpler's prior
circumstances to justify the frisk. The
25, (quoting Terry, 392 u.S. at 30).
possession of the carpet knife created
The court of special appeals had precourt of appeals granted certiorari and
sufficient additional circumstances to jusviously acknowledged that" [a] lthough a
reversed.
tify the frisk. Simpler, 318Md. at 321,568
reasonable 'stop' is a necessary predecesThe court of appeals began its analysis
A.2d at 27.
by noting that the sequence of events in
sor to a reasonable 'frisk' a reasonable
Thus, in Simpler v. State, the court of
'frisk' does not inevitably follow in the
the record was unclear as to whether
appeals held that when a policeman
wake of every reasonable 'stop.''' SimSimpler was frisked before or after Wassstops a suspect for a minor offense, the
mer was aware of his age. However, if
pler, 318 Md. at 319,568 A.2d at 25-26,
officer may not, as a "matter of routine
Simpler was frisked before Wassmer
(quoting Gibbsv. State, 18Md.App. 230,
caution," frisk the individual. The burlearned of his age, then Wassmer had
238-39, 306 A.2d 587, 592 (1973». In a
den is on the State to demonstrate that
reasonable suspicion to believe Simpler
similar Situation, the Supreme Court of
the frisk was justified due to additional
was under the age of twenty-one and thus
Colorado held a permissible stop for uncircumstances which created reasonable
his possession of alcohol was in violation
derage drinking did not in and of itself
suspicion that the suspect was armed
of art. 27, section 400A. On the other
justify the subsequent frisk. Simpler, 318
and dangerous at the time of the frisk.
hand, if Simpler was frisked after WassMd. at 319-20, 568 A.2d at 26 (citing
-Angela Vallario
mer was aware of his age, Wassmer had
People v. Sherman, 197 Colo. 442, 593
reasonable suspicion to believe Simpler
P.2d 971 (1979».
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